) .
This figure illustrates our hypothesis about the response of conglomerate returns (measured in the vertical axis) to industry return shocks (measured in the horizontal axis). If internal capital markets are more efficient than external ones, then diversified firms which use them efficiently should be able to take more advantage of positive industry shocks and be less exposed to negative industry shocks, resulting in a convex return response to shocks. Inefficiently used internal capital markets lead to a concave return response pattern. The return response of single-segment firms (which do not have the internal capital market option) is the basis for comparison. It is normalized to be on the 45°l ine.
Conglomerate Return
Industry Shock F  i  g  u  r  e  1  :  T  h  e  r  e  s  p  o  n  s  e  o  f  c  o  n  g  l  o  m  e  r  a  t  e  r  e  t  u  r  n  s  t  o  i  n  d  u  s  t  r  y  s  h  o  c  k  s  .   t  h  e  o  p  t  i  o  n  t  o  r  e  -a  l  l  o  c  a  t  e  r  e  s  o  u  r  c  e  s  i  n  t  e  r  n  a  l  l  y  i  s  n  o  t  a  v  a  i  l  a  b  l  e  .  W  e  m  e  a  s  u  r  e  t  h  e  i  m  p  a  c  t  o  n  t  h  e   d  i  v  e  r  s  i  fi  e  d  fi  r  m  r  e  t  u  r  n  r  e  l  a  t  i  v  e  t  o  t  h  i  s  v  a  l  u  e  .   T  h  e  p  a  t  t  e  r  n  s  i  n  F  i  g  u  r  e  1  a  r  e  i  n  d  e  e  d  w  h  a  t  o  u  r  r  e  s  u  l  t  s  s  h  o  w  :  r  e  t  u  r  n  s  o  f  h  i  g  h  -v  a  l  u  e  d  c  o  n  -g  l  o  m  e  r  a  t  e  s  e  x  h  i  b  i  t  a  c  o  n  v  e  x  s  e  n  s  i  t  i  v  i  t  y  t  o  i  n  d  u  s  t  r  y  r  e  t  u  r  n  s  h  o  c  k  s  ,  w  h  i  l  e  t  h  o  s  e  o  f  l  o  w  -v  a  l  u  e  d   c  o  n  g  l  o  m  e  r  a  t  e  s  s  h  o  w  a  c  o  n  c  a  v  e  p  a  t  t  e  r  n  .  T  h  u  s  ,  w  e  s  h  o  w  t  h  a  t  t  h  e  r  e  l  a  t  i  o  n  b  e  t  w  e  e  n  c  o  n  g  l  o  m  e  r  a  t  e   v  a  l  u  a  t  i  o  n  s  a  n  d  t  h  e  s  e  n  s  i  t  i  v  i  t  y  t  o  i  n  d  u  s  t  r  y  s  h  o  c  k  s  i  s  c  o  n  s  i  s  t  e  n  t  w  i  t  h  t  h  e  e  ffi  c  i  e  n  t  (  i  n  e  ffi  c  i  e  n  t  )   u  s  e  o  f  t  h  e  i  n  t  e  r  n  a  l  c  a  p  i  t  a  l  m  a  r  k  e  t  b  y  g  o  o  d  (  b  a  d  )  c  o  n  g  l  o  m  e  r  a  t  e  s  . M  o  r  e  o  v  e  r  ,  t  h  e  r  e  a  r  e  i  n  t  e  r  e  s  t  i  n  g  a  s  y  m  m  e  t  r  i  e  s  .  M  o  s  t  o  f  t  h  e  c  o  n  v  e  x  i  t  y  f  o  r  g  o  o  d  c  o  n  g  l  o  m  -e  r  a  t  e  s  i  s  d  u  e  t  o  l  o  w  e  r  s  e  n  s  i  t  i  v  i  t  y  t  o  n  e  g  a  t  i  v  e  i  n  d  u  s  t  r  y  s  h  o  c  k  s  ,  w  h  i  l  e  t  h  e  c  o  n  c  a  v  i  t  y  f  o  r  b  a  d   c  o  n  g  l  o  m  e  r  a  t  e  s  m  o  s  t  l  y  c  o  m  e  s  f  r  o  m  t  h  e  i  r  u  n  d  e  r  p  e  r  f  o  r  m  a  n  c  e  w  h  e  n  t  h  e  r  e  a  r  e  p  o  s  i  t  i  v  e  i  n  d  u  s  t  r  y   n  e  w  s  .  I  n  o  t  h  e  r  w  o  r  d  s  ,  o  u  r  r  e  s  u  l  t  s  s  h  o  w  t  h  a  t  t  h  e  o  p  t  i  o  n  t  o  r  e  -a  l  l  o  c  a  t  e  r  e  s  o  u  r  c  e  s  i  n  t  e  r  n  a  l  l  y  i  s   m  o  s  t  v  a  l  u  a  b  l  e  i  n  a  l  l  o  w  i  n  g  (  g  o  o This figure plots the frequency distribution of the conglomerate discount in our sample. The sample period is from 1979 to 1998. The discount is the percentage difference between the market-to-book ratio of the conglomerate and the weighted average market to book ratio of a portfolio of industry and size matched single-segment firms. The median discount in the sample is 13.2%. T  h  e  r  e  f  o  r  e  ,  a  s  f  o  r  l  e  v  e  r  a  g  e  ,  w  e  h  a  v  e  c  o  m  p  a  r  e  d  a  v  e  r  a  g  e  m  a  r  g  i  n  a  l  t  a  x  r  a  t  e  s  b  e  t  w  e  e  n  g  o  o  d  a  n  d   b  a  d  c  o  n  g  l  o  m  e  r  a  t  e  s  a  n  d  t  h  e  m  i  m  i  c  k  i  n  g  p  o  r  t  f  o  l  i  o  .  T  h  e  m  a  r  g  i  n  a  l  t  a  x  r  a  t  e  f  o  r  t  h  e  m  i  m  i  c  k  i 
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. Adjusted R-Squared (Mimicking) -21% (1) This is the p-value from a F-Test for whether the concavity of good conglomerates across shock (relative to focused firms) is statistically different from the convexity of bad conglomerates across shocks. Leverage is measured as total liabilities (Compustat data item 181) divided by total assets (Compustat data item 6). The data on marginal tax rates is the same used by Graham (2000) . For the mimicking portfolio leverage (marginal tax rate) is equal to the weighted average leverage (marginal tax rate) of the stand-alone firms in the mimicking portfolio, where the weights are asset weights. Adjusted R-Squared (Mimicking) -21% (1) This is the p-value from a F-Test for whether the concavity of good conglomerates across shock (relative to focused firms) is statistically different from the convexity of bad conglomerates across shocks.
(2) R-Squared is not well defined for SURE (it is a GLS regression). The number given here is merely the percentage of the variance explained by the regressors. This table shows the joint probability distribution of conglomerate classification for two alternative discount measures. Discount measure one is based on direct firm matching. We compare the market-to-book ratio of each conglomerate to the weighted average market-to-book ratio of the firms in the mimicking portfolio, where the weights are asset weights. Discount measure two is obtained by comparing conglomerate valuations to weighted average median industry valuations as in Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) . The correlation between the two discount measures is 0.81. For each discount measure, good (bad) conglomerates are those in the bottom (top) 1/3 of the discount distribution. The remainder are classified as intermediate.
